The asbestos cancer epidemic. by LaDou, Joseph
Asbestos is a general term applied to certain
ﬁbrous minerals long popular for their thermal
resistance, tensile strength, and acoustic insula-
tion properties. Asbestos minerals are divided
into two groups: serpentine and amphibole.
Only one type of asbestos is derived from ser-
pentine minerals: chrysotile, also known as
white asbestos. Amphibole minerals include
five asbestos species: amosite, crocidolite,
tremolite, anthophyllite, and actinolite. Two
of these are the most commercially valuable
forms: amosite, or brown asbestos, and croci-
dolite, or blue asbestos.
More than 30 million tons of asbestos in
its various forms have been mined in the past
century. Asbestos is one of the most pervasive
environmental hazards in the world, present
in more than 3,000 manufactured products.
All forms of asbestos can result in asbestosis
(a progressive fibrotic disease of the lungs),
lung cancer, and mesothelioma, a cancer aris-
ing in the membranes lining the pleural and
peritoneal cavities.
Asbestos exposure affects not only asbestos
workers but also their families, users of asbestos
products, and the public as it is exposed to
building materials and asbestos in heating and
ventilating systems. In developing countries,
where protection of workers and communities
is scant or nonexistent, the asbestos cancer epi-
demic may be even more devastating than it
has been in developed countries. The battle
against asbestos is in danger of being lost where
the human costs may be greatest, in developing
countries desperate for industry.
With rare exceptions, the developed
countries defer to the United Nations (UN)
the responsibility for international occupa-
tional health. The UN’s international agen-
cies have had only limited success in bringing
occupational health to the industrializing
countries. The World Health Organization
(WHO) is responsible for the technical aspects
of occupational health and safety. The
International Labor Organization (ILO)
Conventions and Recommendations (Takala
1999) are intended to guide all countries in the
promotion of workplace safety. The ILO has
no enforcement power, and UN funding for
the WHO and the ILO is so meager that nei-
ther agency has the power of moral suasion.
UN Agencies
International organizations such as the WHO
and the ILO have long been important sources
of information about toxic substances such as
asbestos, but these agencies are expected to
provide more than just information. Most
people presume that the WHO, the ILO, and
many other public health agencies intercede
directly when an epidemic occurs. Recent reve-
lations of the degree to which these agencies
are manipulated by industry representatives
explain how the asbestos industry was able to
dissuade the WHO and the ILO from inter-
vening to stem the asbestos cancer epidemic
(Castleman 1999, 2001; Castleman and
Lemen 1998b; Rosenstock and Lee 2002;
Watterson 1993).
The asbestos cancer epidemic currently
sweeping the globe would have been largely
preventable if the WHO and the ILO had
responded early and forcefully. Not only was
the WHO late in recognizing the emergence
of the asbestos cancer epidemic, but the
WHO also ignored it for years and, quite
without explanation, continues to fail to
address the problem of asbestos mining and
manufacturing and world trade of a known
human carcinogen.
The WHO, through its International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and
in the collaborative program with the
International Program for Chemical Safety
(IPCS), together with the ILO and the UN
Environment Program, has on several occasions
assessed the effects of asbestos and different
asbestos ﬁber types on human health, but it has
not done so in a timely manner and has had no
real effect on the continued global use of
asbestos (IARC 1973, 1977, 1987, IPCS 1986,
1989, 1996, 1998; WHO 1989, 1997).
Early reports linking asbestos and cancers
of the lung and pleura by British, South
African, and Italian investigators in the 1950s
(Doll 1955; Tweedale 2002; Vigliani et al.
1964; Wagner et al. 1960) laid the foundation
for the deﬁnitive investigations of insulation
workers in the United States by Irving Selikoff
and his colleagues. Selikoff’s studies showed
the greatly increased mortality of insulation
workers exposed to asbestos and made clear
that an epidemic of occupational and environ-
mental cancer was under way (Selikoff et al.
1964). In the following decade, IARC studied
the carcinogenicity of asbestos ﬁbers, but it was
not until 1986, 22 years after publication of
the article by Selikoff et al. (1964), that the
WHO published its first document on
asbestos. By that time, the asbestos cancer epi-
demic was claiming tens of thousands of lives.
By 1973, the full range of the danger of
asbestos was apparent (Hammons and Huff
1974; Huff et al. 1974, 1975). It was at this
point, at least 30 years ago, that one might
have expected the WHO to take up the cudgel
against asbestos.
All one need do is review the list of
asbestos industry advocates involved in the
writing of the WHO documents to see how
the confusion arose over which asbestos ﬁbers
were to be considered carcinogenic (Egilman
et al. 2003; Infante, in press; Lemen, in press;
Tweedale 2000). The last WHO publication
to recommend a protective exposure standard
for asbestos was published 15 years ago
(WHO 1987). The WHO’s only recent pub-
lication is a pamphlet on how to avoid
asbestos-induced health effects (WHO 2000).
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The asbestos cancer epidemic may take as many as 10 million lives before asbestos is banned
worldwide and exposures are brought to an end. In many developed countries, in the most
affected age groups, mesothelioma may account for 1% of all deaths. In addition to mesothe-
liomas, 5–7% of all lung cancers can be attributed to occupational exposures to asbestos. The
asbestos cancer epidemic would have been largely preventable if the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) had responded early and responsibly.
The WHO was late in recognizing the epidemic and failed to act decisively after it was well under
way. The WHO and the ILO continue to fail to address the problem of asbestos mining, manu-
facturing, and use and world trade of a known human carcinogen. Part of the problem is that the
WHO and the ILO have allowed organizations such as the International Commission on
Occupational Health (ICOH) and other asbestos industry advocates to manipulate them and to
distort scientiﬁc evidence. The global asbestos cancer epidemic is a story of monumental failure to
protect the public health. Key words: amosite, asbestos, asbestos cancer epidemic, chrysotile, croci-
dolite, ICOH, ILO, international occupational health, lung cancer, mesothelioma, WHO.
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Research CommentaryThe WHO appears to be satisﬁed at this point
that it has addressed the asbestos problem with
a series of publications, none of which gets to
the root problem of the epidemic.
Antero Aitio of the IPCS recently stated, 
At present, WHO has no activity on asbestos in
progress—mainly as WHO work is more geared
toward risk assessment than risk management—
and quite apparently, asbestos at present is more a
problem for risk management—especially of
course in building renovation all over the world,
and in many areas, increasingly, in developing
countries. (Aitio A. Personal communication)
If the WHO had spent the past three decades
pressing the world community to end asbestos
mining and manufacture, the world could
have gone a long way to add asbestos to polio
and smallpox viruses as conquered agents.
Part of the explanation for this bland
acceptance of the asbestos cancer epidemic is
that the WHO and the ILO have allowed
organizations such as the International
Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)
and other asbestos industry consultants and
experts to manipulate them and to distort the
scientific evidence. The WHO and the ILO
were lulled into inaction by conﬂicting scien-
tiﬁc reports of the epidemic. The WHO and
the ILO unfortunately respond readily to polit-
ical pressure and industry inﬂuence, and they
fail to overcome industry public relations tech-
niques employed for obfuscating scientific
issues. To this day they continue to play little
more than a minor role in efforts to control or
reverse the asbestos cancer epidemic.
The ICOH is a private organization of
occupational health and safety specialists.
Many ICOH members are employees of major
corporations or consultants to industry. When
called upon as experts, they avoid the sugges-
tion of a “conﬂict of interest” by stating that
they are representatives of an unbiased interna-
tional commission. The WHO did adopt dis-
closure rules, but despite exhortation from
scientists, it continues to be criticized for its
poor implementation of these rules. The
WHO has declined requests to adopt a policy
of publicly releasing the conﬂict of interest dis-
closure statements of individuals appointed to
its expert panels (Axelson et al. 2002).
Robert Murray, a former president of the
ICOH, was a paid consultant to the asbestos
industry,
whose writings on asbestos in the British Journal of
Industrial Medicine in 1990–91 establish him
uniquely as a defender of the asbestos industry for
its past and present business conduct. (Castleman
1996)
Murray held an ofﬁcial position with the ILO
while he represented the ICOH and the
asbestos industry. During Murray’s leadership
of the ICOH, consultants to the asbestos
industry became prominent on the relevant
ICOH scientific committees. The ICOH
Scientiﬁc Committee on Fibers for many years
has been dominated by members affiliated
with the asbestos industry. Scientiﬁc commit-
tee members have claimed to “represent the
ICOH” at meetings around the world, often
misleading both international agencies and
developing countries about asbestos while not
disclosing their industry connections (Ashford
et al. 2002; Grandjean 1997; LaDou 1998;
Richter and Berman 2000; Watterson 2000).
The evidence is everywhere to be found.
Castleman and Lemen (1998a) cited a few
recent examples:
In July 1997, copies of WHO draft reports called
“Asbestos and Health” and “Asbestos and
Housing” became available for technical review.
Both report drafts read as if they had been written
by the asbestos industry. 
Although at least 85% of asbestos today is used
in asbestos-cement construction materials, 
the housing draft offered only the vaguest infor-
mation [about] the hazards of building with
asbestos-cement sheets and pipes; it did not warn
of the need for special cutting tools equipped with
suction hoods and high-efﬁciency dust capture. It
said nothing to direct or encourage people to use
safer substitute materials for asbestos-cement pipe
and sheet products. The health report described
high exposures to asbestos as largely a thing of the
past, in complete disregard for the way asbestos
products … are made and used today….
Castleman and Lemen (1998a)
in many developing countries (Castleman
1999). Neither of the WHO reports men-
tioned the proliferation of national bans on
asbestos by European countries.
Critical early reviewers of the reports said
that they suffered from many errors of fact
and imbalance. Morris Greenberg, HM
Inspector of Factories, United Kingdom,
pleaded for an extension of the review process,
“for the reputation of the WHO” (Greenberg
1997). Alan Dalton, a health, safety, and envi-
ronment coordinator for the Transport and
General Workers’ Union, pressed the WHO
to do better, noting that an editorial in The
Lancet (Lancet 1997) had lamented the
decline in the WHO’s reputation for technical
expertise (Dalton 1997). Philippe Grandjean,
of the University of Southern Denmark
Odense, urged the WHO to emphasize that
there were alternative building materials that
could be used instead of asbestos cement
(Grandjean 1998).
The WHO Regional Office for Europe
published the “Asbestos and Health” report in
1999 (WHO 1999). The report received
immediate criticism from the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and
from Lorenzo Tomatis, former director of the
IARC. One month after the report’s publica-
tion, it was withdrawn. The report was revised
and reissued in an improved form a year later
(WHO 2000).
The battle against asbestos is in danger of
being lost where the human costs may be
greatest, in developing countries desperate for
industry. Relentless efforts are being employed
in the intensive campaign to establish and
maintain the asbestos industry in these coun-
tries (Castleman 2000, 2001; Kazan-Allen
2003; Reuther 1997). The Indian asbestos
industry, assisted by Canadian interests,
announced plans to stage a conference in Delhi
in 2000 to promote the manufacture and use
of asbestos products. Before the meeting, a
WHO letter was widely circulated in which an
official of the WHO Regional Office for
Southeast Asia wrote that the asbestos-cement
industry and its products are “highly eco-
friendly” (Aldana et al. 2000). WHO ofﬁcials
are often poorly informed about asbestos and
subject to manipulation by industry represen-
tatives; this is particularly so in the WHO
regional ofﬁces (LaDou 2002).
The ILO is a coordinating body that plays
an important role in promoting occupational
health and safety. It sets minimum standards
in the ﬁeld of occupational health and safety
(Takala 1999). ILO conventions are intended
to guide all countries in the promotion of
workplace safety and in managing occupa-
tional health and safety programs. The ILO
Conventions and Recommendations on occu-
pational safety and health are international
agreements that have legal force only if they
are ratiﬁed by the governments of the member
states. The ILO has no enforcement authority,
and most member states do not ratify the ILO
Conventions (LaDou 2003).
The ILO shares responsibility with the
WHO for the failure to address the asbestos
cancer epidemic. Responding to industry
pressures and unrelenting scientific distor-
tions, member states failed to support ILO
efforts to confront the epidemic. The lack of
participation of its member states discourages
the ILO from taking on important occupa-
tional health issues. The ILO Asbestos
Convention of 1986 (ILO 1986) is a good
example. Written 18 years ago and not
amended since that time despite major stud-
ies that show that all forms of asbestos cause
asbestosis and cancer, the ILO Asbestos
Convention does not ban asbestos, only cro-
cidolite and certain manufacturing processes.
Member states of the ILO are under con-
stant pressure from the international asbestos
industry to protect jobs and national pros-
perity. The ILO Asbestos Convention, as
weak and outdated as it is, has been ratified
by only 27 of the 176 ILO member states
(Table 1; LaDou 2003).
The asbestos cancer epidemic is often por-
trayed as a classic struggle of workers and
communities against the entrenched wealth,
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certainly that, but this is only part of the
story. The asbestos cancer epidemic is first
and foremost a public health issue that
requires the forceful and effective intervention
of public health agencies. In this regard, the
UN and many other responsible agencies
have failed miserably because they were cap-
tured by the industry they were supposed to
control.
Asbestos Bans
The only way to assure an end to the asbestos
cancer epidemic is to ban asbestos mining and
to ban all asbestos manufacture. This approach,
which has been taken in many developed
countries, is even more necessary in develop-
ing countries, where enforcement of health
and safety regulations is not a viable alterna-
tive to a ban. Some further examples of indus-
try manipulation will demonstrate how the
ban movement has been successfully opposed
for many years.
An international meeting was held in
1994 in São Paulo, Brazil. Its organizer was
the courageous Brazilian labor inspector
Fernanda Giannasi, a woman who was
charged with “criminal defamation” by the
Brazilian subsidiary of the multinational
Saint-Gobain Corporation in a vain effort to
silence her objections to the asbestos industry.
The meeting called for a global asbestos ban.
The conference was held in a very tense
atmosphere. The Canadian government, the
French Asbestos Committee, and Brazilian
asbestos manufacturers were outspoken in
their opposition to the meeting. Events lead-
ing up to the meeting explain why.
The ILO had been approached in 1993 by
the International Fiber Safety Group (IFSG)
to hold training workshops in Brazil and
Mexico to train specialists in the reading of
chest X-ray films. The IFSG offered to bear
most of the cost of the Latin American work-
shops (Giannasi and Thébaud-Mony 1997).
The IFSG’s representative was Scott Houston,
who actually worked in Quebec as the director
of the Asbestos Institute, an industry associa-
tion. The IFSG was created as a result of
agreements within the international asbestos
industry, although its exclusive representation
of asbestos interests was obscured by its name.
Inside the ILO, agreements with the IFSG
were handled by longtime asbestos industry
representative Michel Lesage (Giannasi and
Thébaud-Mony 1997).
Lesage, introduced at the Brazil conference
as a medical expert from the ILO, was also a
member of the board of directors of the ICOH
and a spokesman for the asbestos industry.
Lesage had previously been an official of the
Quebec Asbestos Mining Association and has
since returned to Canada. He spoke against the
proposed asbestos ban (Castleman 2000). His
statements at the conference surprised the
other participants, who had expected the ILO
to have a position distinct from that of the
asbestos industry. Lesage advanced the concept
of “controlled use” of asbestos, “safe” practices
that are a ﬁction in the developing countries
where regulations is seldom enforced and vol-
untary standards are almost never imple-
mented or monitored (Castleman 2003;
Egilman and Roberts 2004). The strictest
occupational exposure limit in the world for
chrysotile asbestos (0.1 ﬁber/cc) is estimated to
be associated with lifetime risks of 5/1,000 for
lung cancer and 2/1,000 for asbestosis
(Stayner et al. 1997). This exposure limit can
be technically achieved in the United States
and in a few other highly industrialized coun-
tries, but the residual risks still are too high to
be acceptable. In newly industrializing coun-
tries engaged in mining, manufacturing, and
construction, asbestos exposures are often
much higher, and the potential for epidemics
of asbestos-related disease is greatly increased
(Giannasi and Thébaud-Mony 1997; Izmerov
et al. 1998).
Marianne Saux, also an ICOH board
member, was introduced in Brazil as a labor
expert representing the French Ministry of
Labor. She was actually an employee of
asbestos manufacturer Saint-Gobain, a fact
known to her ICOH colleagues but made
public only after an investigative journalist
wrote a book in France about the asbestos
industry and its international dimensions
(Malye 1996). The meeting was followed
within months by a meeting jointly sponsored
by the ILO and the asbestos industry (repre-
sented by the IFSG).
A monograph on fibrous materials was
prepared for the ILO by the ICOH Scientiﬁc
Committee on Fibers (Castleman 1999). The
monograph was distributed by the ILO to sci-
entiﬁc reviewers in August 1997. Experts on
asbestos (among them, William Nicholson,
Morris Greenberg, and John Dement) noted
with dismay that the asbestos chapter had
been written by Jacques Dunnigan, Director
for Health and Environment for the Asbestos
Institute, and that the editor-in-chief was
Graham Gibbs, another member of the
ICOH board of directors and perennial repre-
sentative of the Canadian asbestos industry.
Nicholson, Greenberg, and Dement declined
to review chapters of the draft ILO report, not
wanting to have their names associated with it
(Castleman 1999; Castleman and Lemen
1998b). Strong protests from unions in the
United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, and
the United States followed, along with criti-
cism from scientists. The ILO judiciously
withdrew the report from consideration as an
ILO publication.
ICOH Vice President Bengt Knave
expressed surprise to learn of the asbestos con-
troversy in January 1998, then refused to dis-
cuss the matter. In an effort to understand how
the ILO had come to believe that the draft
fibers report was being prepared by the ILO
“in cooperation with” the ICOH, the ILO was
asked to provide a copy of the cover letter that
accompanied the monograph when it was
delivered to the ILO by the ICOH Scientiﬁc
Committee on Fibers (Ashford et al. 2002).
Jukka Takala, chief of the Occupational Safety
and Health Branch, Working Conditions and
Environment Department at the ILO, has
denied all efforts to obtain the document
(Ashford et al. 2002).
ICOH President Jean-Francois Caillard
presided over an ICOH meeting in Nice,
France. He introduced and praised J.P. Beffa,
President of Saint-Gobain, in gratitude for
support to the ICOH meeting given by the
asbestos company. When the ICOH officers
and board members later met in Paris, they
convened in the Saint-Gobain boardroom, as
did the ofﬁcers of all the scientiﬁc committees.
Later, at an address before the French Society
for Occupational Medicine, Caillard said that
asbestos, which was responsible for an esti-
mated 2,000 deaths annually, had been a
“health catastrophe” for France (Caillard
1997). Caillard defended French occupational
physicians from criticism of their failure to
recognize and to properly report the asbestos
cancer epidemic. Caillard did not mention his
own close ties to the asbestos industry, or
those of many of his French colleagues
(Thébaud-Mony 2003).
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Table 1. Countries that have ratiﬁed the ILO Asbestos
Convention (ILO 1986) and the year ratiﬁed.
Country Year
Belgium 1996
Bolivia 1990
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1993
Brazil 1990
Cameroon 1989
Canada 1988
Chile 1994
Colombia 2001
Croatia 1991
Cyprus 1992
Ecuador 1990
Finland 1988
Germany 1993
Guatemala 1989
Netherlands 1999
Norway 1992
Portugal 1999
Russian Federation  2000
Serbia and Montenegro  2000
Slovenia 1992
Spain 1990
Sweden 1987
Switzerland 1992
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  1991
Uganda 1990
Uruguay 1995
Zimbabwe 2003
Data from LaDou (2003).Funding of International
Agencies
The WHO and the ILO are poorly funded
and are able to direct only very small sums to
occupational health and safety programs
around the world. The courtly diplomacy of
the WHO and the ILO often masks the
meagerness of their accomplishments in inter-
national occupational health and safety. The
agencies are primarily European in their
staffing, and they go to extremes to achieve
consensus on every issue, greatly limiting their
effectiveness in addressing important problems
in public health.
The WHO Programme for Occupational
Health supports a staff of only four people.
Regional WHO ofﬁces have few, if any, special-
ists trained in occupational health and safety.
SafeWork, the ILO Programme on Safety,
Health at Work, and the Environment, has
been leading the ILO’s efforts to promote occu-
pational health. The 2-year ILO SafeWork
budget was recently cut. According to its direc-
tor, “The result is a virtual disappearance of
interest in occupational safety and health”
(Takala 2002). For example, the enforcement
(labor inspection) unit of SafeWork has been
reduced to a single person.
To be successful, the international agencies
will need to rise above the level of their current
activities, sadly underfunded and mired in
hopeless attempts to placate industry while
compromising on their mission to protect the
public health and the health and safety of
workers. Nowhere is the problem more obvi-
ous than in the evaluation of carcinogenicity of
chemicals at IARC. Lorenzo Tomatis, former
director of IARC, asserts that IARC is unscien-
tiﬁcally and prematurely downgrading carcino-
gen classiﬁcations of chemicals for which there
were clear and undeniable positive results in
experimental bioassays (Tomatis 2002). James
Huff, who was instrumental in developing the
IARC Monographs program in the 1970s and
the U.S. National Toxicology Program since
then, has elaborated on the increase in industry
inﬂuence at IARC in recent years (Huff 2002).
The Lancet published an editorial agreeing that
“IARC may have come under undue influ-
ences, especially commercial ones,” and urged
WHO programs to adopt more transparency
and greater access by nonindustry scientists
and organizations (Lancet 2003).
Asbestos Exposure Globalizes
From the beginning of the 20th century,
world production of asbestos grew steadily. In
Western Europe, Scandinavia, North America,
and Australia, the manufacture and use of
asbestos products peaked in the 1970s. At that
time, worldwide asbestos production exceeded
5 million tons/year. Despite everything that
was known about the health effects of
asbestos, annual production remained at
>4million tons for more than a dozen years.
To this day, > 2 million tons of chrysotile are
mined and shipped around the world each
year. Asbestos industry advocates allege that
crocidolite is the ﬁber with the greater risk for
lung cancer and that chrysotile can be handled
safely. Actually, on a per-ﬁber basis, the high-
est risks of lung cancer have been shown for
chrysotile (Dement et al. 1994; Infante, in
press; Stayner et al. 1996; Tossavainen 2004).
The largest asbestos producers are Russia,
China, Canada, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and
Zimbabwe (Table 2). Canada dominates
world trade, with an annual export of about
300,000 tons of chrysotile asbestos. The trade
value of crude chrysotile asbestos averages
about $500 Canadian per ton.
More than 70% of the world production
is used in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
Asia (Table 3), in countries desperate for
industry and naive to the health effects of
occupational and environmental exposures to
asbestos. Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia,
and Thailand are the only countries that con-
sumed > 60,000 tons of asbestos in 2000.
These six countries accounted for > 80% of
the world’s apparent consumption of asbestos,
although underreporting is an obvious prob-
lem. The highest rate of consumption occurs
in Russia (3.4 kg/capita/year), whereas
< 0.1 kg/capita/year is still used in Western
Europe or North America (Takahashi and
Karjalainen 2003).
In 1974, about 350,000 tons of asbestos
were used in Japan (3.1 kg/capita/year), but in
1995 the registered incidence of mesothelioma
(5 cases/million/year) was much lower than in
other industrialized countries. Moreover, in
Russia, the extensive use of asbestos would
predict a high mesothelioma incidence. There
is no explanation for the low rates of mesothe-
lioma in these and many other countries
except the obvious likelihood that mesothe-
lioma is not being properly reported. As is the
case in Eastern Europe, no reliable incidence
data are available for the developing countries
in Asia, Africa, or South America. The areas
where the epidemic is now beginning to cause
the greatest loss of life are the very areas where
nonreporting of asbestos-related cancers is a
major problem.
The asbestos-based multinational corpora-
tions of the past are all in bankruptcy proceed-
ings and/or in other businesses. The asbestos
industry today is composed of national com-
panies whose political inﬂuence is large within
their countries but is not globally coordinated.
The protection and advancement of asbestos
globally are mainly promoted by the govern-
ment of Canada, the largest asbestos-exporting
country. The success of Canadian efforts to
export chrysotile as a safer asbestos are readily
apparent in Asia. Most Asian countries have
enforced a ban on the use of crocidolite
(Table 4), but no Asian country except Saudi
Arabia has yet banned chrysotile asbestos.
Singapore comes close to a full ban on
asbestos, but this is most likely because it can
readily relocate its asbestos interests in neigh-
boring countries. Japan and Vietnam are cur-
rently amending their laws and regulations to
adopt a total ban of asbestos, including
chrysotile. These three countries may provide
an important inﬂuence in the region, with an
asbestos ban not even under consideration, at
least ofﬁcially, in any of the other Asian coun-
tries, despite campaigns by nongovernmental
organizations for bans on asbestos in Korea,
Malaysia, and India.
The likelihood of a successful ban on
asbestos in Asia is reﬂected in the current levels
and recent trends of asbestos consumption.
Consumption levels range from 0 in Singapore
to 1.9 kg/capita/year in Thailand. In Japan, the
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Table 3. Asbestos consumed by country, 2000.
Country Tons kg/capita/year
Russia 447,000 3.4
China 410,000 0.4
Brazil 182,000 1.3
India 125,000 0.2
Thailand 121,000 3.0
Japan 99,000 1.5
Indonesia 55,000 0.3
South Korea 29,000 1.9
Mexico 27,000 0.4
Belarus 25,000
Turkey 19,000 0.5
Kyrgyzstan 17,000
Spain 15,000 0.7
South Africa 13,000 0.5
Colombia 12,000 0.9
Zimbabwe 12,000
Romania 10,000 0.5
Azerbaijan 8,000
Canada 5,000 0.2
Portugal 5,000
Taiwan 5,000
Ecuador 4,000
Kazakhstan 4,000 1.8
Pakistan 4,000
Other countries 20,000
Total 1,673,000
Data from U.S. Geological Survey, 2000.
Table 2. Asbestos production by country, 2000.
Country Tons
Russia 752,000
China 350,000
Canada 320,000
Brazil 209,000
Kazakhstan 179,000
Zimbabwe 152,000
Greece 32,000
South Africa 19,000
India 15,000
Swaziland 13,000
United States 5,000
Iran 2,000
Other countries 2,000
Total 2,050,000
Data from U.S. Geological Survey, 2000.level of 0.6 kg/capita/year (or 79,463 tons) is
decreasing from a peak of 3.1 kg/capita/year
(or 352,110 tons) in 1974. A striking contrast
in asbestos use can be seen across Asia. The
wealthy industrialized countries show a steady
decrease in asbestos use, whereas the poorer
developing countries show a deﬁnite increase
(Table 5) (Takahashi and Karjalainen 2003).
As countries gain in industrial afﬂuence, their
hazardous, costly industries migrate to poorer
neighboring countries.
The Cost of Failure to Act
Occupational exposures to asbestos consti-
tute a major health hazard in all industrial-
ized countries of the world. Peto et al. (1999)
predicted that deaths from mesothelioma
among men in Western Europe would
increase from just over 5,000 per year in
1998 to about 9,000 by the year 2018. In
Western Europe alone, past asbestos exposure
will cause a quarter of a million deaths from
mesothelioma over the next 35 years. The
number of lung cancer deaths caused by
asbestos is at least equal to the number of
deaths from mesothelioma. The ratio may be
much higher than 1 to 1, with some reports
suggesting up to 7 to 1 (Howie 2001), so
there may be more than a half million
asbestos cancer deaths in Western Europe
over the next 35 years (Peto et al. 1999). In
Sweden, Jarvholm et al. (1999) have reported
that the number of deaths caused each year
by malignant mesothelioma is greater than
the number of deaths caused in that country
by all workplace injuries.
Worldwide, many millions of workers have
been exposed to asbestos in the workplace.
About 20–40% of adult men report some past
occupations and jobs that may have entailed
asbestos exposures at work (Goldberg et al.
2000; Tossavainen 1997). In the most affected
age groups, mesothelioma may account for 1%
of all deaths (Peto et al. 1995). In addition to
mesotheliomas, 5–7% of all lung cancers can
be attributable to occupational exposures to
asbestos (Tossavainen 2004). A number of
studies have projected the premature deaths
that will result from the asbestos cancer epi-
demic (Goldberg et al. 2000; Howie 2001;
Jarvholm et al. 1999; Peto et al. 1999;
Tossavainen 1997, 2000, 2004; Tossavainen
and Takahashi 2000). The ILO has taken the
incidence of asbestos-related cancer in Finland
and extrapolated it to the world worker popu-
lation, resulting in an estimate that at least
100,000 and maybe as many as 140,000 work-
ers die each year from asbestos exposures
resulting in cancer (ILO 2003). When the vari-
ous estimates from this and other studies are
extrapolated to include the world population,
they project that the asbestos cancer epidemic
will cause 5–10 million deaths, past and pre-
sent (Leigh 2001). In this conservative esti-
mate, it is assumed that asbestos exposures are
going to cease and that the epidemic will run
itself out, but the world’s production of
asbestos, which went down by half in the
1990s, seems to have stabilized at around
2 million tons/year in 2001–2002, and further
progress is far from assured. There is no indica-
tion at this time that a global ban on asbestos is
likely to be accepted by all countries, and inter-
national enforcement of a ban on asbestos is
unlikely to occur. In developing countries,
where little or no protection of workers and
communities is taking place, the asbestos can-
cer epidemic may be even more devastating
and may continue indeﬁnitely.
Conclusion
Most countries ban asbestos after the external
costs of mining and manufacture begin to
affect the proﬁtability of the industry. Health-
related costs, if borne by the asbestos industry,
are far higher than the return on sales. Such
costs include proper warnings, stringent
hygiene measures to prevent occupational and
environmental exposures, and full treatment
and compensation to those who develop
asbestos-related diseases. Migration of the
industry to developing countries allows compa-
nies to continue to make a proﬁt in the manu-
facture and sale of asbestos products. The low
cost of mining and manufacture in developing
countries gives the asbestos industry an unfair
advantage in the marketplace when competing
against safer substitute materials. Developing
countries increasingly bear the externalized
costs of an epidemic of disease and pollution
from asbestos, costs that should be borne by
the asbestos industry and reﬂected in the prices
of asbestos products.
One country has made a particularly
shameful contribution to future generations
of asbestos disease. Canada has used its
full inﬂuence in international organizations to
protect its export market for asbestos, and
Canada has aggressively promoted the use of
asbestos in developing countries. Leading sci-
entists such as Irving Selikoff have called on
Canada since the 1970s to close the asbestos
mines and pension off the workers (now esti-
mated at around 1,500 in all of Canada)
rather than continue exporting virtually all
the asbestos mined to poor countries. With
the asbestos multinational corporations gone,
the government of Canada stands out as the
most powerful opponent of national and
international efforts to ban asbestos around
the world. The sacriﬁce of honor and princi-
ple is harmful to the international reputation
of Canada, and the people of Canada should
demand a higher standard of their govern-
ment on the world stage.
The export of asbestos mining and manu-
facture to developing countries provides an
opportunity to continue the use of asbestos
products and propagates asbestos exposures in
areas that do not recognize and report health
effects. The asbestos cancer epidemic will have
no end until this shameful practice stops. The
WHO and the ILO, along with many other
public health agencies, need to step forward
with a clear demand for an international ban
on asbestos and plans to accomplish the goal.
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